



Schopenhauer acknowledges that there is more to erotic desire than egoism, and he is anxious to distinguish it from generalised appetite. Ultimately, however, we find him paying lip-service to the beloved’s ‘irreplaceability’ only to put forward views that are ultimately in tension with it. His conception of agape is likewise problematic, and it is here that the question of asceticism comes to the fore. In what sense, if any, does asceticism involve life-denial or self-denial? What is its relation to agape? And are there any reasons why the genuine lover must pursue this path? This article concludes that there are such reasons, but that they can be properly articulated only within a framework that takes us beyond Schopenhauer’s official position. Schopenhauer’s relation to theism will remain unclear, but we shall have scotched any suggestion of an uncompromising atheism. 
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Schopenhauer’s conception of love tends to be summarised along the following lines. First, there is erotic love which is selfish and grasping. This love is desire-involving, and, as such, is driven by sex, sexual desire being ‘the invisible central point of all action and conduct [which] peeps up everywhere, in spite of all the veils thrown over it. ​[1]​  Second, there is agape – a selfless form of love which is to be identified with compassion or sympathy.​[2]​  These loves are mutually exclusive, and agape with its ‘generous self-sacrifice’ is the purest form thereof. It is also said to bring salvation. ​[3]​ Erotic love, by contrast, is ‘impure’, presupposing a selfishness which conditions hatred and wickedness.​[4]​ It is the source of all suffering, since the desire it involves is a manifestation of the malevolent and hungry will which constitutes the innermost essence of things. ​[5]​ 
	 The idea that there is a malevolent and hungry will at the basis of everything gives expression to Schopenhauer’s supposed atheism. As Nietzsche put it, he is 
‘the first admitted and uncompromising atheist among us Germans’, ‘the ungodliness of existence counted for him as something given, palpable, indisputable’.​[6]​ We shall see that the picture is rather more complex, for although Schopenhauer emphasises our tendency to conceal the [atheistic] truth from ourselves, there is enough in his position to suggest that the ‘veil’ we employ in this context can be set against an opposite but no less significant concealment, namely, that which is operative when we fail to see beyond the will-driven dimension of reality which motivates egoism. It is in the context of appreciating this point that we shall have reason to question his atheism, and to consider the implications for an understanding of his conception of love. 
What I have said so far on Schopenhauer’s behalf suggests that desire-involving eros is the source of all suffering, and that it stands opposed to desire-less agape, which latter is the source of our salvation. The implication here is that desire is to be transcended; at least, it is to be transcended if we are to be saved. Now to those for whom desire is synonymous with life, there is something deeply problematic to such a claim. To cite Nietzsche again, Schopenhauer gives precedence to ‘the unegoistic, [] the instincts of compassion, self-denial, self-sacrifice’, these values being that ‘on the basis of which he said ‘no’ to life, also to himself’.​[7]​ The idea that desire is to be transcended becomes less problematic if it is allowed that desire is inherently egoistic, and that there is more to life than egoism, although this raises the question of the limits of desire and life, and the implications for an understanding of love, and indeed, its salvific significance. It is in the context of discussing these issues that I shall consider an influential albeit disputable strand within Christianity which seems to map onto Schopenhauer’s position.
Schopenhauer acknowledges at times that there is more to erotic desire than egoism, and he is anxious to distinguish it from generalised appetite. Ultimately, however, we find him paying lip-service to the beloved’s ‘irreplaceability’ only to put forward views that are ultimately in tension with it. His conception of agape is likewise problematic, and it is here that the question of asceticism comes to the fore. In what sense, if any, does asceticism involve life-denial or self-denial? What is its relation to agape? And are there any reasons why the genuine lover must pursue this path? I shall conclude that there are, but that they can be properly articulated only within a framework that takes us beyond Schopenhauer’s official position. His relation to theism will remain unclear, but we shall have scotched any suggestion of an uncompromising atheism. 

2. ‘Selfishness is eros, sympathy or compassion is agape’.
The title quotation here concludes Schopenhauer’s case for saying that ‘[a]ll love (agape, caritas) is compassion or sympathy’,​[8]​ and ‘all love that is not sympathy is selfishness’.​[9]​ So he grants a form of love which is not sympathy, but insists that it is an ‘impure’ form, presupposing a selfishness which conditions hatred and wickedness.​[10]​ He claims also that agape with its ‘generous self-sacrifice’ brings salvation.​[11]​  
This disjunction of eros and agape won unequivocal support from the theologian Anders Nygren, whose book Agape and Eros was one of the most influential books on love in the twentieth century.​[12]​ He assigned these loves to ‘two entirely separate spiritual worlds, between which no direct communication is possible’,​[13]​ the Christian and Platonic worlds. Erotic/Platonic love is acquisitive and egocentric: 

Everything centres on the individual self and its destiny. All that matters from first to last is the soul that is aflame with Eros…The very fact that Eros is acquisitive love is sufficient to show its egocentric character: for all desire, or appetite, and longing is more or less egocentric.’​[14]​  

Agape, by contrast, involves ‘sacrificial giving’ and ‘self-sacrifice’. It is ‘unlimited and unconditional’,​[15]​ ‘free from all desires’,​[16]​ and excludes self-love.​[17]​ It is ‘Christianity’s own original basic conception’, ​[18]​ it is primarily God’s love: ‘God is Agape’, ‘Agape is God’s way to man’, ​[19]​ and man is a ‘channel of God’s down-pouring love’. ​[20]​ This down-pouring love is expressed in our love for God and neighbour, but, surface similarities notwithstanding, it is unrelated to ‘the “humane” ideals of altruism and the ethic of sympathy’,​[21]​ which have ‘entirely different spiritual roots’, ​[22]​ acquisitive roots that do not involve God. 
	Altruism and the ethic of sympathy are fundamental to Schopenhauer’s conception of agape, and if we grant with Nygren that they are to be distinguished from the love of God, then an atheistic interpretation of Schopenhauer becomes plausible. I shall return to Schopenhauer’s supposed atheism. First though, we must consider some objections to Nygren’s position. Stephen G. Post regards it as one of several within the Christian tradition which depicts ‘the highest form of love as utterly heedless of the self’. ​[23]​ It ‘misleadingly exaggerates the valid principle of unselfishness’​[24]​ and presupposes an unsatisfactory conception of love and an analogously problematic conception of God:​[25]​ 

Divine love, so often understood as the perfect example to which human love must conform, is mistakenly interpreted as containing no element of self-concern. This view is based on the false assumption that the divine neither needs nor seeks the mutual good of fellowship with humanity…if divine love is not unmotivated, but rather yearns for response and requital, the ideal of selfless love becomes untenable. ​[26]​ 

Post argues that the ideal of selfless love supports Nietzsche’s complaint that Christianity is the ‘religion of self-annihilation’.​[27]​ He insists, however, that we must not respond to the limitations of this picture by retreating to Nietzsche's counter-ideal of egocentric selfishness.​[28]​ We might note that a version of this counter-ideal already lurks in its supposed (selfless) antithesis, at least if it is assumed that, qua channels of God’s down-pouring love, we are somehow submerged in the process. The power of love surely cannot be an obliterating force.​[29]​ 
	According to Post, both ideals - self-effacing love and egocentric selfishness - ‘obscure the actual giving and receiving that is the telos of love’,​[30]​ and ‘[m]utual love or reciprocity is the only appropriate fundamental norm for human interrelations, and for the divine-human encounter as well’.​[31]​ The implication here is that an adequate account of either form of love must include reciprocity. If we accept also that the relevant giving and receiving map on, respectively, to the two forms of love at issue, then it follows that a satisfactory account must involve reference to both. Such even-handed accounts are to be found in the Christian tradition. Thus, we find the theologian Sarah Coakley exploring ‘the productive intertwining of erōs with agapē from the time of the early marriage of Christianity and Platonic philosophy’.​[32]​ She gives the example of Dionysius’s conjoining of Platonic eros and Christian agape,​[33]​ noting his attribution of ‘ecstatic yearning not only to human lovers of God, but also, prototypically, to divine love of creation’.​[34]​ The following passage comes from his Divine Names:  

It must be said that the very cause of the universe in the beautiful, good, superabundance of his benign yearning for all, is also carried outside of himself in the loving care he has for everything…God is yearning on the move, simple, self-moved, self-acting, pre-existent in the Good, flowing out from the Good onto all that is and returning once again to the Good.​[35]​

	According to this way of thinking, eros itself is to be comprehended in God-involving terms. Such a claim stands opposed to Nygren’s position, and we are to suppose that it would be resisted likewise by Schopenhauer, assuming that we take seriously his atheism and the idea that everything is reducible to sex. Coakley uses the term ‘sub-Freudian’ to describe this latter kind of position, ​[36]​ notes the precedence it gives to the satisfaction of our ‘physiological desires’, and distinguishes it from the Dionysian view according to which ‘God [] is basic, and “desire” the precious clue that ever tugs at the heart, reminding the human soul –however dimly – of its created source’. ​[37]​  She claims also that this propulsion towards God – the desire that ‘ever tugs at the heart’ – involves a ‘chastening of the human lust to possess, abuse, and control’ as our misplaced longings are brought into conformity with the divine will. It is made clear that the envisaged ascetic transformation does not mean that sex and human desire do not matter.​[38]​ On the contrary, sex has profound theistic significance, and our desires are not to be obliterated: openness to God is not an ‘invitation to be battered’.​[39]​ We shall see that Schopenhauer takes seriously some of these Dionysian themes, his official position notwithstanding.  

3. Erotic love and desire
The official position has it that eros is a selfish love, and that the desire it involves is driven solely by sex, sexual desire being ‘the invisible central point of all action and conduct [which] peeps up everywhere, in spite of all the veils thrown over it’.​[40]​ ‘The sexual impulse’, Schopenhauer continues, ‘is ‘the most vehement of all cravings, the desire of desires, the concentration of all our willing’,​[41]​ it ‘constitutes even the very nature of man’.​[42]​  
We are back with the Nietzschean claim that desire is central to self and life, and Schopenhauer implies that it all comes down to sex, acknowledging our tendency to conceal this from ourselves by throwing ‘veils’ over the sexual impulse. He returns to this when discussing the delusions to which lovers are subject. Poets of all ages seek to express the longing of love. This longing burns in the breast of one who ‘can find no expression for the intimation of infinite rapture or infinite pain with which it is filled’, and it ‘affords the material for all erotic poetry of the sublime kind, which accordingly rises into transcendent metaphors that soar above all that is earthly’.​[43]​ This longing and this pain of love: 

are the sighs of the spirit of the species, which sees here, to be won or lost, an irreplaceable means to its ends, and therefore groans deeply. The species alone has infinite life, and is therefore capable of infinite desire, infinite satisfaction, and infinite sufferings. But these are here imprisoned in the narrow breast of a mortal; no wonder, therefore, when such a breast seems ready to burst, and can find no expression for the intimation of infinite rapture or infinite pain with which it is filled.​[44]​  

His talk here of infinite life, desire, satisfaction, and suffering would sit well in a theological tract.​[45]​ Witness Dionysius on the divine love of creation, a ‘yearning on the move…always proceeding, always remaining, always being restored to itself’, and remember that out desires can be brought into conformity with the divine will. The idea of bringing our desires into conformity with the will, divine or otherwise, is alien to Schopenhauer, for he takes our desires to be irrevocably will-driven. We are to suppose also that he would interpret this theistic language as just one more ‘veil’ shielding us from the truth, for, like Nietzsche, he strives to expose the delusions that ‘soar above all that is earthly’, the fact of this particular matter residing at the level of ‘the sexual impulse alone’.​[46]​ This impulse is a ‘malevolent demon’​[47]​ which is ‘simply the will-to-live’. It is the will-to-live of the species as it ‘striv[es] to maintain its type’​[48]​ by filling our narrow breasts with its endless ‘sighs’.  
The will-to-life of the species is expressed in sexual desire, and Schopenhauer takes this ‘desire of desires’ to be a manifestation of the cosmic will which ‘is the innermost essence, the kernel, of every particular thing and also of the whole’. This will ‘appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and also in the deliberate conduct of man, and the great difference between the two concerns only the degree of the manifestation, not the inner nature of what is manifested’.​[49]​ So malevolent erotic striving occurs at every level of life, and this raises the questions of whether Schopenhauer has good arguments for regarding this impulse as malevolent, and how, if at all, it differs from the object-directed desire haunting the lovelorn poet, a desire which seems neither blind nor malevolent.​[50]​ 
There is a serious question, with or without Schopenhauer, about the distinction between appetite and desire. Nygren’s claim that ‘all desire, or appetite, and longing is more or less egocentric’ suggests that the distinction comes to nothing, or, more weakly, that its terms are alike in being egocentric, albeit ‘more or less’. Mark Platts deplores the undue attention given to appetitive desire, arguing that it overlooks the variety of desires.​[51]​ He bemoans the ‘empty, brutish, and long’​[52]​ life which lies ahead for those whose desires remain so restricted, and advocates the category of moral desire, one which involves being responsive to something other than our own bodily needs and satisfactions. This orientation is fundamental to Schopenhauer, as will become clear when we examine his conception of agape. We shall see also that he accepts likewise that the life of desire can be empty, brutish, and long, implying, problematically, that it is inevitably so. Easy cannon fodder for the Nietzschean celebrant of life and desire, although such a response threatens to re-introduce the counter-ideal of egoistic selfishness, especially if desire is inevitably egoistic. 
Egoistic desire provides the focus of Schopenhauer’s description of the life of desire, and we are told that it involves a lack or deficiency which brings suffering to its subject.​[53]​ This lack can be filled and the suffering abated because desires can be satisfied. However, the satisfaction is temporary, and desires reappear, producing more suffering, demanding similar satisfaction, and so on ad infinitum:

so long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we never obtain lasting happiness or peace…Thus the subject of willing is constantly lying on the revolving wheel of Ixion, is always drawing water in the sieve of the Danaids, and is the eternally thirsting Tantalus.​[54]​

All of this suggests that there can be no genuine satisfaction within desire’s trajectory, and that it can be found only if desire is transcended and satisfaction made permanent. Ivan Soll regards this supposedly ‘angelic ideal’ as ‘a hell in which our desires have withered away’, and rejects the ‘notion that a perfect being would have no desires and that a perfect state of being is one in which there are no desires, because to desire something is to lack something and thus entails an imperfection’.​[55]​ He concludes that: 

the eternal recurrence of desire should be seen as a triumph rather than a failure of the life of desire. The downfall of desire does not consist in its inevitable phoenix-like re-emergence from its own ashes; it would consist rather in that cessation of the rebirth of desire, which has been misconceived as its ultimate if unattainable goal. Nirvana is the death of desire, not its satisfaction…We should not forget the crucial but commonly ignored truth, that desire is itself desirable. Long live desire! ​[56]​   

We have noted already that a desire-less conception of God is deficient and dispensable. So for some theists, the eternal recurrence of God’s desire is a triumph rather than a failure, and human desire can be similarly desirable. However, it does not follow that desire is invariably desirable, for some desires are not, like, for example, the desire to control, possess, and abuse. So Schopenhauer’s misgivings are understandable to this degree at least, and there are no good reasons for insisting that a life in which such desires have withered away is more hellish than one in which they hold exclusive dominion. What does not follow, however, is that desire itself is to be transcended, unless there are independent reasons for thinking that desire just is the lust to control, possess, and abuse. 
God’s desire involves a recurrence whose ‘eternity’ outstrips the limits of a particular contingent existence,​[57]​ and Schopenhauer operates likewise with a conception of eternal desire, only it concerns the infinite desire of the species rather than of God. Furthermore, there is evidence to suppose that species desire is desirable in some sense. After all, its satisfactions are infinite, and its endless ‘sighs’ fill our narrow breasts when we fall in love. Perhaps this is simply Tantalus writ large: the satisfactions are, after all, counterbalanced with infinite sufferings. But what of the lover’s endless sighs? Are they really to be described in these diabolical terms? And if these terms are inappropriate, this surely has implications for the nature of the infinite desire they express.  

4. The lover’s endless sighs
We are returned to the erotic lover’s desire, and the question is not simply whether it is malevolent, but how it is to be distinguished from generalised appetite. Schopenhauer is alert, and seemingly accommodating, to the distinction between object-directed desire and appetite. He distinguishes sexual impulse in general from sexual impulse ‘as directed to a definite individual’,​[58]​ berating Lichtenberg for denying the reality of passionate love.​[59]​ So he intends to do justice to this reality, with respect both to its desire and, as Simon May puts it, ‘its willingness to sacrifice everything for the beloved’. ​[60]​ ‘The passion of being in love’: 

is directed to an individual object, and to this alone, and thus appears, so to speak, as the special order of the species. For the opposite reason, mere sexual impulse is base and ignoble, because it is directed to all without individualisation, and strives to maintain the species as regards quantity, with little consideration for quality. But individualisation, and with it the intensity of being in love, can reach so high a degree that without their satisfaction all the good things of the world and even life itself lose their value. It is then a desire that exceeds in intensity every other; hence it makes a person ready for any sacrifice, and, if its fulfilment remains for ever denied, can lead to madness or suicide.​[61]​

Much of this fits the experience of being in love, although one wonders whether readiness 'for any sacrifice’ really involves a willingness to sacrifice everything for the beloved. The following extract suggests not. It also shows how Schopenhauer purports to explain love’s ‘individualisation’ in terms of the species’ needs: 

[E]veryone who is in love will experience an extraordinary disillusionment after the pleasure he finally attains; and he will be astonished that what was desired with such longing achieves nothing more than what every other sexual satisfaction achieves, so that he does not see himself very much benefited by it…On the other hand, the satisfaction is really for the benefit only of the species, and so does not enter into the consciousness of the individual, who, inspired by the will of the species, here served with every kind of sacrifice a purpose that was not his own at all. Therefore, after the consummation of the great work, everyone who is in love finds himself duped; for the delusion by means of which the individual was the dupe of the species has disappeared. ​[62]​

The lover’s desire for the beloved is acknowledged, yet all the emphasis is upon the pleasure she promises to deliver, her irreplaceability being reducible to the fact that nobody will do it better. His readiness for sacrifice is purely for the sake of such pleasure, with no suggestion that it is for the sake of the beloved, or that she counts for anything in her own right. Sacrificial giving is not generally accepted as the true test of erotic love, of course, and we know that Schopenhauer is in agreement on this score, regarding erotic love as essentially egoistic. The remainder of the extract corroborates this interpretation, for the idea that disillusionment follows the pleasure suggests not merely that the ‘Tantalus’ model is presupposed, but that desire must involve possession and control. 
Schopenhauer’s lover is disappointed by the real thing: it, or rather, his beloved, falls short of his expectations. This way of expressing the matter is telling, for the beloved’s role in this context is purely instrumental, and there is no hint of the give and take which seems fundamental to love’s true telos. We might note also that the lover’s disappointment is entirely predictable. After all, he is not in love, and if he were in love, then this language of achievement and benefit would be inappropriate, and he would not experience extraordinary disillusionment ‘after the pleasure he finally attains’. On the contrary, he would find that the desire he feels for his beloved, being irreducible to the desire for pleasure, is not eliminated by sexual contact.​[63]​ It is a desire for the beloved herself, and such desire is not best viewed as an inclination to possess her or to get something out of her. As Talbot Brewer so beautifully puts it, we are concerned with a ‘mesmeric attraction to, and delight in, an element of the world already wholly given…The gift is present now…it is not a promise of a future deliverable. It is not a proposition to be or do anything, but a willing self-exposure, a free opening to another’s gaze through which one permits oneself to be known in hopes of being appreciated and at risk of being scorned’. ​[64]​ 
Desire for the beloved is not eliminated by sexual contact, but it is sustained by love, and we are told often enough that love is short and blind. ​[65]​ If this is so, then the lover is deluded, but concerning the nature of the beloved (‘she is the most beautiful woman in the world’, ‘she is divine’, ‘she is life itself’) rather than the degree of sexual pleasure she induces. Now even if we accept, as we need not, that love is short, it does not follow that it distorts rather than reveals. As Roland Barthes puts it, the proverb [love is blind] is false, for love ‘opens its eyes wide…produces clear-sightedness’.​[66]​ The claim is absurd assuming that we are deluded in love, but this assumption simply contradicts the position at issue and cannot, in itself, undermine it. To show that love is blind in the relevant sense would be to show that it’s all just a matter of sex, that the sexual impulse exhausts man’s nature, and that the intimation of infinite rapture filling the lover’s breast can be explained in purely biological terms. Or again, that erotic love is irreducibly and exhaustively egoistic, a malevolent force pretending to be something more, all the better to secure its wicked end. The story is familiar, but not mandatory, for we have been given no evidence to suggest this metaphysical framework exhausts reality. We shall see eventually that it is undermined by Schopenhauer’s own metaphysical lights.
 Schopenhauer insists that erotic desire ends in disappointment, and we are to suppose that it withers away in the process – a claim which is seemingly at odds with the ‘Tantalus’ model to which he commits. Schopenhauer's talk of desire’s withering refers to the desire for this particular woman: it withers away when the lover realises that the pleasure she affords is on the same paltry level as that delivered by anyone else. However, this does not mean that the desire for sexual pleasure has also died, nor indeed the desire for another woman; for these are fated to reappear ‘so long as our consciousness is filled by our will’. I have claimed to the contrary that the lover’s desire for his beloved is not eliminated by sexual contact, and that it is not to be viewed as a desire to get anything in any case. We can note also that the lover’s ‘thirst’ in this context is inappropriately modelled on drinking from a sieve, for this image suggests that he receives nothing from his beloved, and remains in a state of torment. As Lucretius said, ‘water is ne’er granted him’.​[67]​ The picture recalls Schopenhauer’s conception of the life of desire, but this conception is disputable, especially in the present context. After all, the lover receives from his beloved the gift she offers of herself. This gift tends to deepen rather than to eliminate his desire, and the last thing he wants is its extinction.​[68]​ Long live desire indeed! 
Lucretius says that the lover ‘thirsts even whilst he gulps’, and although this aptly describes drinking through a sieve it also captures the intensification of desire in its consummation. Bernard of Clairvaux uses the image in describing our ‘thirst’ for God as it plays out in heaven: 

In this place we find satiety without the sense of having indulged too much. Here we find a desire to penetrate deeper which is never quenched, yet which has no sense of unrest about it. Here we experience that eternal and incomprehensible desire which knows no lack. Here, finally, is that state of sober intoxication which does not come from drinking wine. This state does not result from being drenched with wine but from being set afire for God….Happiness is complete, but there is no end to desiring, and because of this the search goes on.​[69]​

This is a world apart from Soll’s ‘angelic ideal’, for the satisfaction here is irreducibly desire-involving. Happiness is ‘complete’, and although there is no such completion on earth, Bernard’s description captures something of erotic love. As Schopenhauer would say, we have here a picture of the ‘infinite rapture’ intimated in the lover’s longings, although he would insist that this state is not remotely heavenly. He must surely also deny that this desire is incomprehensible, for it concerns the eternal life of the species, and there is nothing more down to earth and effable than this.    

5. Agape, God, and desire 
For Nietzsche, agape is the hellish counterfeit which supplants eros: hellish, because desire-less, counterfeit because genuine love is desire-involving. Agape demands self-denial and sacrifice, and involves ‘morality's dominion and delusion’, specifically, the morality of compassion. Agape is also central to Christianity, but Schopenhauer, an admittedly uncompromising atheist, must surely deny that agape is the love of God. Witness Simon May:

As an atheist, Schopenhauer doesn’t see such a division [between agape and eros] in terms of heaven and earth, God and man. For him agape doesn’t have a divine source or inspiration. It doesn’t, for example, need to be activated by God’s grace or by some other higher power. Instead it is the purely human capacity for compassion or sympathy. ​[70]​

Schopenhauer deplores our tendency to ‘soar above the earth’, and believes that it activates when we contemplate matters of love. At one level then, it makes perfect sense for him to deny that agape has a divine source, and to insist instead that it is a purely human capacity. The difficulty, however, is that the question of what it really means either to soar above the earth or to remain within its limits is as unclear as that of how we are to comprehend the concept of heaven,​[71]​ and there is a clear enough sense in which Schopenhauer is taking us beyond this world in his discussion of agape, namely, the sense in which he envisages something beyond the will-driven wheel of Ixion, which latter mode of existence corresponds to his own vision of hell.​[72]​
Love, he claims, ‘leads to salvation, that is, to the entire surrender of the will-to-live, i.e., of all willing’. The love in question is ‘compassion or sympathy’, and ‘its origin and nature [is] seeing through the principium individuationis’.​[73]​ This ‘seeing through’ involves ‘abolishing the distinction between our own individuality and that of others’, it ‘makes possible and explains…the most disinterested love, and the most generous self-sacrifice for others’,​[74]​ and Schopenhauer identifies it with the lifting of the veil of Maya.​[75]​ Such a veil – also described as a ‘delusion and deception’ – is ‘transparent for the person who performs works of love’, and one who is so disposed has moved beyond the egoism which ‘concentrates our interest on the particular phenomenon of our own individuality’.​[76]​ His ‘heart feels itself enlarged, just as by egoism it feels contracted’, ​[77]​ and ‘through the reduced interest in our own self, the anxious care for that self is attacked and restricted at its root; hence the calm and confident serenity afforded by a virtuous disposition and a good conscience’.​[78]​ For the most part, however, we remain enveloped in the circuit of egoism, swept along by the allurements of hope and the sweetness of pleasures as the wheel continues to turn. This, we are to suppose, is what it really means for hell to masquerade as heaven, and Schopenhauer ends by quoting Jesus’ claim that ‘[i]t is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of God’.​[79]​	
The ‘veil’ at issue now is different from that involved in thinking about eros. The offending thought there was that erotic love is more than sex, while the veil concealed the earthly fact and motivated metaphysical soaring. Here the veil is egoism, the guiding force behind eros, which we must transcend if we are to love aright and be redeemed. So the veil misleading us now restricts rather than expands reality: soaring above the earth is our only hope. This hope is forlorn, however, and so it is virtually impossible to enter the Kingdom of God.    
Reference to the Kingdom of God need not make Schopenhauer a theist, and he is adamant in any case that theism is ‘calculated with reference to the capacity of the crowd’, placing ‘the primary source of existence outside us, as an object’. ​[80]​ He prefers mysticism, which ‘draw[s] this source gradually back into ourselves as the subject’.  Mysticism involves ‘the consciousness that we ourselves are the kernel of the world and the source of all existence, to which everything returns’.​[81]​ Mysticism and asceticism (abandonment of all willing) ‘stand in the closest connection’.​[82]​
The reasonable theist agrees that God is not outside us, as an object,​[83]​ and he grants also that there is something to learn from the mystics, especially about the relation between ourselves and our source – witness the work of Dionysius in this regard. We can learn, for example, that erotic desire is irreducible to egoism, and that it is to be attributed not merely to human lovers of God but also to God’s love of creation. This narrows the gap between God and self, for we can partake in His yearning. We know also that Schopenhauer has an analogous thought, though the yearning belongs to the spirit of the species rather than to God.  
The sighs of the species’ spirit are egoistically motivated and insufficiently ‘deep’ to capture the mystical state with which Schopenhauer is concerned. Mysticism leads beyond willing, it ‘makes possible and explains the most disinterested love’, and in true love, ‘there remains neither I nor me, mine, to me, thou, thine, and the like’. ​[84]​ Such love suggests self-annihiliation – it does, after all, involve ‘the entire surrender of the will-to-live’. For Schopenhauer, however, this surrender involves recognising that we can ‘soar upwards to a better existence’, and ‘by means of moral effort’. ​[85]​ The implication here is that there is an alternative to egoism – there remains ‘neither I not me nor mine’ in this egoistic sense - so that we are not, after all, condemned to the ‘empty, brutish, and long existence’ which Platts foresees for those whose motivations remain so restricted. It also suggests a significant concession to the propulsion/desire which, for Coakley, institutes a ‘chastening of the human lust to possess, abuse, and control’.    
Schopenhauer claims also that the existence we seek through morality demands ‘severe renunciation’ and ‘the denial of our own self’, and that this existence is ‘inconceivable to us’.​[86]​ Self-denial again suggests annihilation,​[87]​ but the self in question clearly concerns ‘man’s finite, animal sinful nature’, which does not exhaust our nature. We have an ‘eternal, supernatural side’ bringing freedom and salvation. Schopenhauer ascribes this ‘great truth’ to Brahmanism and Buddhism, and claims that Christianity teaches it allegorically: the Fall of Adam represents ‘man’s finite, animal, sinful nature’, Christ's conduct, teaching, and death represents our ‘eternal, supernatural side’. ‘Every person is Adam as well as Jesus’.​[88]​ 
These two aspects correspond to eros and agape, as Schopenhauer conceives them, and I have argued already that his egoistic interpretation of eros is inadequate. So eros is more expansive than he believes and this affects the nature and value of erotic desire, and, more generally, the underlying metaphysics.​[89]​ Agape leads beyond the metaphysics of will, and there is no immediate implication that it requires total self-effacement. Self-interest is rather ‘reduced’ and ‘restricted’. Yet all this inaugurates a love demanding more radical asceticism, a ‘severe renunciation’ leading us beyond our moral transformation so far, and preparing us for a ‘better’ and ‘inconceivable’ existence after our ‘ephemeral life on earth’. 
Schopenhauer rightly attributes more to reality than we can conceive. Like many philosophers and theologians, he holds that love provides clues to this dimension, and that we can partake in it, however inadequately. His descriptions of ‘severe renunciation’ are overblown,​[90]​ and motivated by his assigning sex and desire to ‘man’s finite, animal, sinful nature’. Our only hope then seems to be a love ‘utterly heedless of the self’, the desiring self demanding annihilation. The desire of erotic love poses a challenge to this framework, seeming more like the mystic’s desire for God than a Tantalus-like urge. This conception grants salvific significance to eros, it demands a radical re-interpretation of Schopenhauer’s claim that the desire it involves is ‘infinite’, and it calls to mind his talk of our ‘eternal, supernatural side’.   
Schopenhauer and Nygren insist that our eternal, supernatural side is a spiritual world apart from our natural side. This dualism is compromised if eros prefigures such a dimension, and, this granted, we may love aright without ceasing to desire. Desire can transcend egoism, and this need involve no delusion, whether of morality or eros. Desire is, nevertheless, ambiguous, and may require purification. His claim that in true love ‘there remains neither I nor me, mine, to me, thou, thine, and the like’, relates to his antipathy towards egoism, but also to his belief that there is something beyond this spatio-temporal world, something remaining ‘after the complete abolition of the will’.​[91]​ To the objection that this something is surely nothing, he responds that it certainly is ‘for all who are still full of the will’. He adds, in his final sentence, that ‘to those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this very real world of ours with all its suns and galaxies, is – nothing’. This nothing (allegedly the Prajna-Paramita of Buddhism) is ‘the “beyond of all knowledge”, in other words, the point where subject and object no longer exist’.​[92]​ Hardly the blank non-existence of Nietzsche, but no objectifiable ‘something’, nor anything comprehensible. One wonders how this is to be reconciled with the claim that this beyond is the region of true love, although it remains possible, indeed plausible, that love is the greatest mystery of all.  

6. Conclusions
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